Lifetime Employment and Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly with Profit-Maximising and Joint-Stock Firms

Authors

  • Kazuhiro Ohnishi Institute for Basic Economic Science

Keywords:

Endogenous Timing, Profit-Maximising Firm, Joint-Stock Firm, Lifetime Employment, Strategic Commitment

Abstract

This paper investigates endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly consisting of a proft-maximising frm and a joint-stock frm. There are two stages and the frms simultaneously and independently announce in which stage they will offer lifetime employment as a strategic commitment. If both frms decide to offer lifetime employment in the same stage, a simultaneous commitment game occurs, whereas if both frms choose different stages, a sequential commitment game arises. At the end of the game, each firm simultaneously and independently chooses its actual output. The paper presents the equilibrium of the endogenous-timing mixed duopoly model.

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Published

2014-10-06

How to Cite

Ohnishi, K. (2014). Lifetime Employment and Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly with Profit-Maximising and Joint-Stock Firms. Institutions and Economies, 6(3), 1–14. Retrieved from https://samudera.um.edu.my/index.php/ijie/article/view/4990

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Section

Articles