Sarjana
Vol. 28, No. 2, Disember 2013, pp. 113-130.

EARLY AMERICAN EXPLOITS IN THE RED SEA REGION, 1860-1945

Salwa Ahmed Qasem Dammag and Shakila Yacob[1]

Abstract

This article examines the beginning of the U.S. interest in one of the most strategically important regions of the world, namely the Red Sea. At the end of the 19th century the U.S. appeared to share in the interest of this vital region. The U.S's involvement in the Red Sea started for purely commercial purposes. After the end of WWI, the U.S. relations with the Red Sea began to evolve, and it is no longer limited only to business concerns but has entered other dimensions as well as cultural and diplomatic dimensions. The economic dimension grew with the discovery of oil in the Gulf region. The Red Sea was linked to the Gulf region as a passage to transport oil to Europe and the U.S. Because Saudi Arabia is the largest oil-producing country in the region and constitutes one of the Red Sea states, this further raised the importance of the Red Sea in American eyes. During World War II, the U.S. policy changed dramatically. After joining the war and growing as the incoming superpower, the U.S. began to focus its foreign policy on the Red Sea region as an important strategic location for its military movements. The establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 also represented a prime change in the Red Sea region, and this change added a new dimension for U.S. interests. Consequently, providing security to Israel and freedom of navigation in the Red Sea has become a prime goal of the U.S. policy in this region.

Keywords: Red Sea, U.S. interests, commercial and diplomatic interest, military bases, oil, Saudi, Israeli.

Introduction

The United States has been involved in the Middle East since the middle of the eighteenth century, through culture, education, religion and activities. Mostly out of evangelical consideration, Americans went to the region as missionaries and archeologists, built schools and hospitals, and established institutes of higher education such as the Syrian Protestant College passim (renamed the American University of Beirut) in 1863 and the American University of Cairo in 1919. On the political and diplomatic front, however, after some involvement in the immediate post-World War I period, the United States resumed its isolationism and deferred to Britain and France over matters related to the region.[2] George Lenezowski says:

> The U.S. did not appear on the global political stage until late of 18th century as its foreign policy had been established on the basis of neutralism and isolation that aimed to distance America from Europe problems. Hardly U.S. opened its boundaries in the second half of the 19th century. Prior to the end of the First World War in 1918 the U.S. demonstrated greater interest in peace and security future in the Middle East

> even though it did not enter into any set of undeclared agreements and deals between the Allied countries in the war, most famous of all is Sykes-Picot agreement (1916).[3]

On the other hand, historians of U.S. foreign policy give very little attention to the U.S. Navy's peacetime activities in the nineteenth century. For example, in his history of U.S. foreign relations before the Civil War, Bradford Perkins suggests that American commercial expansion during this period was largely the result of private enterprise, not deliberate public policy. He belittles the government's involvement, writing that with "forty or fifty largely antiquated ships, the U.S. Navy bustled around the globe, protecting and encouraging trade."[4]

The Red Sea's role as a strategic waterway attracted much competition and foreign interference over successive periods because of its geopolitical and strategic characteristics. Those characteristics and economic, incentives contributed to the Red Sea's being the focus of conflicting powers throughout history until modern times. All major countries from the Portuguese, to the Italians, the French and the British have contributed into it. At the end of the 18th century the United States appeared to share in the interest in this vital region.[5]

This study focuses on the early interests of the U.S. in the Red Sea region. It discusses the United States' interest in the developments of the Red Sea region in terms of its commercial, political and diplomatic orientations. This study then highlights how WWII witnessed the most prominent U.S. foreign policy interventions in the Red Sea within the context of its transformation to become a superpower. Subsequently, an analysis on the increasing geopolitical importance of the Red Sea for the U.S as well as the need to create military bases in the middle of the Red Sea. The developments that led to the increase of the importance of the Red Sea with the emergence of oil in the Gulf countries and the appearance of Israel as one of the Red Sea countries will be discussed.

Commercial Interest

We can trace the beginning of the U.S. interest in the Red Sea since relations began at the end of the 18th century. At that time some American ships had begun to dock at the Yemen's Mocha harbor, [6] (south of the Red Sea) as early as 1798 in order to purchase coffee. North Yemen's history, its coffee, animals, hinds and strategic location had attracted the interests of some U.S. businessmen since the late 18th century but the British and Ottoman who dominated the region delayed the growth of any private U.S. involvement in the country. The ship "Recovery" was the first United States ship to arrive at Mocha sea port through Morehouse in 1798. When the ship made its second visit to Mocha, it left carrying more than 326, 000 tons of coffee.

Because of the number of U.S. ships coming to the Mocha' sea port, a commercial center was established.[7] In 1804, the U.S. flag was raised over a house which was rented under the name "The U.S. Commercial Center" in Mocha. U.S. ships were more frequently coming to the sea port, despite the competition from England. The ship "United States" imported and carried two million pounds of Yemeni Coffee from Al-Mocha' sea port in 1809. The United States became a strong competitor against England and the British East India Company, which monopolized some of the important Eastern goods like Yemeni Coffee which was much more profitable and of better quality than Brazilian Coffee.[8]

As a result, the U.S. turned its attention to Yemen and offered prices, which were much lower than the price offered by the English. This helped Americans to develop their own monopoly of the Yemeni coffee trade. During this period, U.S.-Yemeni trade relations were becoming stronger, and U.S. goods were generally welcomed in the Arabian Peninsula, particularly in Yemen. The Suez Canal played an important role in expanding the volume of trade between the U.S. and the Arabian Peninsula.

In 1895, a U.S. consulate was officially established in Aden. The attention of the U.S. government was concentrated on the southern region of the Red Sea. The U.S. government bore the responsibility of watching over U.S. interests and the individuals who were in charge of these interests in the region. The American policy of setting up a consulate in the region was to provide services for its national interest. U.S. diplomatic representation was very limited in the Arabian east. The U.S. consulate in Aden was the only consulate located at the East coast of the Red Sea with the nearest in the region being Baghdad to the north, Karachi, and Bombay to the east. Thus, it served as a vantage point for watching the development taking place in the Arabian Peninsula and the southern region of the Red Sea.[9]

Despite the challenges and responsibilities which the U.S. consulate encountered in Aden, it is possible to say that this was one of the most active U.S. consulates. The amount of information this consulate gathered indicates high performance and great effort by its employees as they realized the importance of the region to U.S. interests of that time as well as in the future. The U.S. State Department in Washington gave special attention to the information sent by the U.S. consulate in Aden, be it trade or political reporting.[10] During the years of Egyptian military presence in Yemen in the first half of the 19th century, the U.S. established successful relations with Muhammad Ali Pasha to secure a monopoly of a portion of the Yemen coffee trade. One interesting outgrowth of this relationship came after the American Civil War (19861-1865) when the Khedival regime hired a number of American retired military officers (from both the Union and Confederate armies) to strengthen the Egyptian army.[11]

The U.S. also established successful relations in the south of the Red Sea with Ethiopia. Probably the first attempt by an Ethiopian Emperor to seek the opening of official relations with the U.S. was made by Yohannes IV in 1872. The first phase in the development of U.S. interest toward Ethiopia commenced with the signing between the two countries of a commercial treaty in 1903: three years before, diplomatic relations had been established between them. When the U.S. decided in 1906 to send its first representative to Ethiopia, it sent a Consul General rather than a diplomatic agent, thus underscoring the fact that U.S. interest in Ethiopia was primarity commercial.[12]

For some U.S. representatives in the area, U.S. indifference toward Ethiopia, in the face of the growing trade relations between the two countries, became a matter deserving serious attention by the U.S. government. It was Robert P. Skinner-America's consul-general in Marseilles, who took the first step in prodding his government for a move toward establishing official relations with Ethiopia. When the consul-general made the suggestion to the McKinley Administration in 1900, the latter took no action. Three years later, Skinner again advised the Theodore Roosevelt Administration to open official relations with Ethiopia.[13] He argued and urged:

> . . .that diplomatic relations be established with the Abyssinian empire . . . in order to procure exact information for American exporters and manufacturers generally,

> and more particularly to safeguard an important existing commerce. This commerce has created itself in spite of American indifference to the desirability of having direct contact with consuming markets, and is susceptible of being greatly increased.[14]

When the 1927 decision to reestablish American representation in Ethiopia was made, Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg informed the new American minister resident in Ethiopia that:

> In reaching the decision, the Department was influenced in part by reports which led it to believe that Ethiopia offers today in a more readily accessible manner than ever before a potential field of considerable interest to American commerce and for the investment of American capital, in part by a desire to make possible the obtaining of first-hand information from a reliable source regarding the political situation in that country particularly as it is affected by the policies of the principal European powers having special interests therein.[15]

Diplomatic and cultural interest

While American commercial interests grew in the Red Sea region during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the U.S. was not actively involved in the political and territorial maneuvering of that period. This era was characterized by two main features**:** First, the U.S. turned a blind eye to European aspirations for sharing the Arab world. The U.S. administration recognised French and British control over the Arab World as long as these two countries would ensure the protection of U.S. individuals' and companies' interests. Accordingly, all issues related to the U.S. interests in the region were to be addressed to be affected European countries. Concerning Red Sea events, the U.S. had been an observer. In August 1914 when WWI broke out, the Red Sea's two entrances: Suez Canal and Bab al-Mandab were under Britain`s control.[16] Italy was in control of Eritrea. France held the French Somalia colony "Djibouti". Meanwhile, the Ottoman State had been in control of the eastern coast of the Red Sea, except for the British colony at Aden. But the Ottoman influence was decreasing against foreign infiltration into Arabian Peninsula.[17]

To the combatants, winning the war in the Middle East in general, and in the Red Sea region in particular, was the primary objective. The Arab world's position and importance increased for the Allies in general and for British interests in particular. The Britons were fully aware of the Ottomans' threat to their interests in the Arabian Peninsula. The Ottomans were able to establish positions alongside the Red Sea to lay mines against British ships. The Turks were also capable of threatening the British in Aden through the Turkish garrison in Yemen. The two sides had virtually fought a battle in the area of Sheikh Sa'ad in Aden city (south of the Red Sea). It ended up in favourable to the British who inflicted grave damages to Turkish garrison there on November 9, 1914, just a few days following Turkey's declaration of war.[18]

Britain sought to sign agreements with the influential governors of strategically important areas, such as Shareef Hussein of Mecca who ruled over the lands where the Turkish main supply lines and its railroad ran through the Arabian Peninsula. Working with Shareef Hussein, the British could strike Ottoman troops in Arabia. Another agreement was signed with the governor of A'sseer "Al-Edreesi" who collaborated with the British fleet to take control over Al-Lohhyah harbour on the Red Sea. Britain

also signed an agreement with King Abdul-Aziz Ibn-Saud under which he made his country a British protectorate.[19] All of that helped Britain to have a significant and serious role in taking control over the Red Sea during World War I. The "Arab Revolt" became an important element in the Allied victory. British policy aimed to secure the marine route to India through the Red Sea and to maintain Aden port. This would help ensure Aden's access to food supplies from the Horn of Africa, since Aden served as a monitoring post, a centre for supplies and a launching pad for British operations in the Red Sea.[20]

When Italy entered the war in May 1915, the Britain Foreign Ministry become worried, given that the British were aware of Italy's deep interest in the Red Sea's eastern coast and nearby islands. The British assumed that by joining with the Allies in the war, Italy might occupy some islands in the Red Sea. Therefore, Britain moved immediately and occupied the Islands of Farssan and greater Hunaish, Zoqar and Kamaran. By doing so, Britain achieved twofold interests: first, it connected these islands with the Red Sea's eastern coast through the agreement with Al-Edreesi; second, it thwarted Italy's very desire to occupy Farassan islands and take control over the Red Sea's eastern coast.[21]

In the course of these developments in the Red Sea region, the U.S. assumed a passive posture vis a vis the region in the years between the two World Wars. Its role was confined to sponsoring non-political activities, namely cultural and economical ones. The U.S. government to a large extent withdrew from the international politic stage in the period between the two World Wars, following the Congressional decision that America should not join the League of Nations. The U.S. would become an observer, not a participant in most political events.

However, that does not mean that the U.S. was totally isolated from the region. Its relations can be observed in two dimensions: diplomatic and cultural. First, diplomatic relations: U.S. diplomatic relations with the Red Sea States were very limited and varied from one region to another, according to American interests. In Egypt, it raised its diplomatic representation in 1922.[22]

American diplomatic activity was clearer in some parts of the Red Sea. In Yemen, there was an American consul in Aden colony. He was the only American diplomat in the Arabian Peninsula between the two World Wars. A trade agreement was signed between Yemen and America in 1941, but diplomatic relations between the two countries would not begin until 1945. When King Abdul-Aziz lbn-Saud first established his kingdom, he asked the United States for recognition, but the Department of State judged that the size of U.S. interests in the Kingdom did not justify establishing official relations and responded negatively. Several years later the decisions was reconsidered. Negotiations over a friendship treaty between the two countries began in 1933, yet diplomatic representation only started officially in 1942.[23] In Ethiopia, the U.S. consulate in Asmara was established in 1942.[24]

The second dimension of U.S. activity in the region involved missionary and cultural programs. The U.S. Near East Relief Commission was established during World War I. The U.S. government supported the commission financially and diplomatically during the war. The commission continued to operate after the war under the name: Near East Foundation. Its activities to included assisting displaced people, resettlement, housing, health and education. Missionaries' educational activities also increased after the war. The Syrian Protestant College became the Beirut American University 1920. A similar university also appeared in Cairo in 1919. The missionary schools network

expanded in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. A great deal of attention was paid to medical issues and missionary schools had attracted a large number of Muslims. Foreign archeological missions also competed for excavation in the Red Sea States in the era between the two World Wars; U.S. universities and museums were involved in this domain and undertook excavation independently or in cooperation with British and French institutions.[25]

Geostrategic interests: military bases

Until the declaration of war that brought the U.S. into World War II, American policy toward the Red Sea region was based upon protecting its commercial interests and those of American citizens' and refraining from political engagement in a region that was considered a Western European sphere of influence. The U.S. adhered to this policy until it joined the Allies.[26] Then U.S. political and military obligations increased, and America's interests in the region diversified. America's pre-war policy in the region could no longer satisfy its interests. It had to explore a different foreign geopolitical agenda.

During the war, the U.S. played a complementary role and contributed to British war efforts. It provided civil and military supplies and services, which reached its climax after a military aid program known as "Lend-Lease".[27] Officially titled An Act Further to Promote the Defense of the United States, the Lend-Lease Act was signed into law on March 11, 1941. Under that law, U.S. played a role as Britain partner to the British in the Middle East Supply Centre (MESC), which was established in Cairo. Egypt has been vitally important for the U.S. foreign policymakers given that it is the biggest Red Sea state which controls the Suez Canal. Thus it is geographically critical, particularly to the U.S. military. MESC would coordinate and convey necessary supplies to the region's countries to deal with emergency conditions as a result of Mediterranean closure against trade and navigation.[28]

The Roosevelt administration, sought to bolster the beleaguered military forces of Great Britain against Nazi German and Fascist Italy's forces operating in North Africa which included Ethiopia. This was why, even before officially entering the war, Roosevelt created the military aid program known as "Lend-Lease". Ethiopia thus became an assembly point and distribution centre for this aid designed to strengthen Britain's defenses in Libya and Egypt against Germany's famed Africa Corps. The focal point of these Lend-Lease efforts was Eritrea,[29] a former Italian colony commanding a strategic location bordering the Red Sea and had been liberated by British forces in 1941.[30]

The U.S. War Department's efforts in Eritrea were twofold. First, in the aftermath of a secret meeting held in Washington on November 19, 1941, a Royal Air Force (RAF) support base was established at the Eritrean town of Gura. Codenamed "Project 19". The purpose of the base was to repair and return damaged RAF aircraft to the North Africa battle zone with minimal delay. The War Department also refurbished the Eritrean port of Massawa to provide direct support for the British Mediterranean fleet, as well as to maintain naval salvage operation to raise over forty ships scuttled by the Italian navy. By August 1942, less than one year after the War Department's decision to establish a presence in Eritrea, 336 U.S. military personnel were directing projects that employed nearly 16,000 workers, including 2,819 U.S. civilians, 5, 611 Italians, and 7,384 Eritreans.[31]

In addition, the circumstances of the war increased the U.S. military presence on the eastern borders of Arab regions as it. undertook the task of aiding Soviet troops through Iran. This made the U.S. military presence in the Gulf imperative. More than 28,000 U.S. troops were stationed under the so-called Persian Gulf Command.[32] This U.S. military presence in the Arabian Gulf had had its special denotation. The Arabian Gulf used to be within the British sphere of influence until World War II broke out. But the war's conditions brought an American military presence to this oil-rich region. This provided the U.S. with a golden opportunity to enhance its oil interests in the region, especially in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. The U.S. played a significant role making up for the oil shortage in Western Europe, which was the result of the sealing of the Mediterranean in 1942 by the Axis forces and the appearance of German submarines near oil sources in the Caribbean Sea. In the beginning of 1943, American oil made up more than 70% of the energy sources used in the war.[33]

What became significant in this regard was Ethiopia's strategic location on the Red Sea and in close proximity to the Middle East and the Arabian Peninsula. Ethiopia thus became an ideal site for setting up the U.S. defense installations to facilitate the safeguarding of U.S. interests in the region. What brought Ethiopia into America's post-World War II strategic scheme was U.S. interest in the Middle East. The threat that the U.S. presence meant to counter was that which American policymakers thought was posed by the Soviet Union. Throughout the following decades, and until Ethio-American military relations were severed, the U.S. interest in Ethiopia was to reflect these two themes: American security and economic interest in the Middle East on one hand, and the perceived threat or potential threat that the Soviet Union posed to those interests on the other.[34]

By 1953, Americo-Ethiopian military relations were to be formalized through mutual defense agreements which allowed the U.S. to utilize defense installations (the Kagnew Station) in exchange for which Ethiopia became the recipient of American military aid.[35] *The response to National Security Studies Memorandum 115: Horn of Africa,* affirmed the important of Kegnew stations to the U.S:

> "Ethiopia has been a major focal point of U.S. activity in Africa having received $250 million in U.S. economic assistant since 1948 and $150 military aid since 1953.Our direct and tangible interest in maintaining a U.S. communication facility at Kegnew station. The important of Kegnew station to the U.S. has been a major determinant of our involvement in Ethiopia and has shaped our regional policies."[36]

African Research Bulletin writes about Kegnew station:

> ....because it was located in the tropics far from the north and south magnetic poles, the aurora borealis and magnetic storms, in a zone where the limited degree of seasonal variations between sunrise and sunset reduce the need for numerous frequency changes. It was therefore, important to the world-wide network of U.S communications through the Philippines, Ethiopia, Morocco and Arlington, Virginia, and important as well for NATO communications within Western Europe itself when electrical and magnetic disturbances upset communications in those higher latitudes.[37]

Kagnew's main purpose was, therefore, to track satellites, monitor communications and allow American military forces access to the Red Sea. In addition to Kagnew, the

United States also had access to Ethiopian ports and airfields. If needed, they were always available to the United States.[38] Alexander Attilio Vadala writes that:

> Keeping these issues in mind, the United States first established in the 1940s a strategic relationship with Ethiopia in which telecommunications surveillance base near Asmara was constructed. Here again, the Horn of Africa was among the most suitable geographical settings the United States could find with the technology of the time.[39]

One of the first indications that the U.S. had important strategic interests in Kegnew stations was suggested by a memorandum sent by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense in August, 1948. The memorandum was designed to give the Joint Chiefs' appraisal of the strategic requirements of the United States and Great Britain in Saudi Arabia. After setting forth the main Anglo-American interests in Saudi Arabia and the two countries' strategic requirements in the Arabian Peninsula- Red Sea- Socotra Island area, the memorandum indicated that apart from military and communication facilities in Saudi Arabia itself, there were needs that should be met in the "remainder of the area". These were described by the Joint Chiefs, to consist in "telecommunications and airbase facilities in Aden, Hadramaut, Oman, Trucial Oman, Socotra Island and Asmara; air and naval base facilities at Massawa; air and advanced ship repair facilities in Aden; advanced naval base facilities at Bahrain".[40]

A few days earlier, in another memorandum to the Secretary of State, concerning matters relating to the disposition of the former Italian colonies, the Joint Chiefs emphasized the need to secure the "operational availability" of an "air base facility" in Libya, "telecommunication base facility" in Asmara and "air and naval base facility" at Massawa, in the event of an emergency.[41] The memorandum emphasized the Joint Chiefs' interest in the availability of these facilities for U.S. use through "joint" or "participating" rights. Indicating the seriousness with which the suggestion was made regarding U.S. military and naval interest in Eritrea, the Joint Chiefs said:

> As to the nature of the rights in Eritrea, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would state categorically that the benefits now resulting from operations of our telecommunication center at Asmara—benefits common and high military importance to both the United States and Great Britain—can be obtained from no other location in the entire Middle East -Eastern Mediterranean area. Therefore, United States rights in Eritrea should not be compromised.[42]

New dimensions of interest in the Red Sea: the emergence of oil and the Israeli State

The U.S. had paid attention to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region. In 1928 U.S. engineers explored Saudi Arabia in search of oil. In 1932 American companies began to explore oil in Bahrain. In early 1933 petrol gushed out of Bahraini oil wells. Then the U.S. companies scrambled to secure concessions of the Gulf oil.[43] The U.S. specifically intended to secure oil investments in Arab territories. Since such investments were not legally subjected to the U.S. State Department policy in the region, the U.S. companies acted independently as private institutions. Thus, the U.S. economic, political and strategic relations in the Middle East at that time were a result of interaction between America's official policy and private companies' activities in the region as well as the consequences

of such interaction on the international milieu. During this era, relations' between U.S. government and oil industry in the Middle East were established. It was a period in which the U.S. economic considerations interlocked with British competitive interests.[44]

Signs of military conflict and competition between colonial powers apparently emerged during World War II. In the summer of 1940, Italian pilots bombarded the Bahraini Refinery and American oil companies' installations in al-Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Italian pilots were unable to come back to Italy directly, so their planes returned to Eritrea[45] which was then under Italian control, mainly the two harbours of Mosswa and Assop on the Red Sea. The bombardment of Bahrain and al-Dhahran gave rise to the U.S. military entry into Saudi Arabia for the first time. British letters suggest that they had agreed to install an air defence system around the U.S. oil company in al-Dhahran. The air defence contingent included 100 U.S. servicemen stationed there.[46]

It was necessary to drive the Italians out of the Horn of Africa (in particular, Eritrea), after their threat to Gulf oil had been demonstrated. This is incident occurred in November 1941. As such, there was no longer any good reason for Saudi Arabia's king to remain nonaligned. King Abdul-Azez al-Saud tried to be neutral during World War II. It was now in his interests and the Allies' to align himself with them in the war. However, if he chose to join the Allies, the British and American troops would have expected to be deployed in Saudi territories. This is prohibited as non-Muslims are forbidden to enter the Holy Lands. To overcome this obstruction, the British urged the Saudi King to declare war personally against the Germans and their allies.

This incident was the beginning of the first international conflict over oil and it involved the two regions of the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf; given that Italian presence in Eritrea and American oil installations in Saudi Arabia. It is important to note that Saudi Arabia borders the Red Sea and the Arabian / Persian Gulf. Italian bases in the two harbours of Masswa and Assop on the Red Sea helped launch attacks on American oil installations in Saudi Arabia. This, indeed, is a testimony to the interconnection between two regions', i.e., the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf. The Red Sea is not only a passageway for oil, but it is also a launching pad for raids against the U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia.

Most importantly, the rise of oil has given the Red Sea a significant importance to become the main and the fastest passageway for oil export from the Gulf region via the Strait of Hormuz to importing countries like Europe, Japan and the U.S. through the main straits (Bab al-Mandab and Suez Canal) of the Red Sea. The main commodity transported through the Red Sea is oil. The first and most obvious link between the Gulf and the Red Sea is the transportation of Gulf oil via the Suez Canal. This has both economic and strategic implications and is more important than is generally appreciated.

From the 1940s onwards, discussions about oil and the Red Sea primarily meant Saudi Arabia. The U.S. policy in Saudi Arabia since World War II has been based on protecting the oil-rich kingdom. From president Roosevelt to the most recent U.S. presidents, maintaining security and providing protection and stability of Saudi Arabia has been a central doctrine in the security and foreign policy of the U.S. The U.S. presidents, decision-makers and secretaries of state all have emphasized that Saudi Arabia's security is America's and Saudi Arabia represents an indisputedly crucial interest for the US. Thus, for the U.S. policymakers, defending the Gulf province and the Red Sea is vitally important in defending Saudi Arabia's security. Secretary of State Vance would affirm that, "there is no question that we have vital interests' in the

Persian Gulf and that, "we consider the territorial integrity and security of Saudi Arabia a matter of fundamental interest to the United States."[47]

Therefore, it was not a surprise that president Franklin D. Roosevelt pointed on February 16, 1943, that "the defense of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defense of the United States",[48] thereby making possible the extension of the lend-lease program to the kingdom. The U.S. government earnestly considered purchasing the U.S. oil companies' concessions in Saudi Arabia or at least to undertaking administering the TAP pipeline project, which was proposed to connect oil production in Saudi Arabia with the Mediterranean. During this period (1942-43), the American government never hesitated to provide political support to the U.S. oil interests in Saudi Arabia. This was the real beginning of U.S. interests in the Red Sea given that it is the main route for transporting oil from the Arabian Gulf to the whole world.

Shortly, prior to the end of World War II, the Executive Committee on Economic Policy in the U.S. Department of State was assigned to delineate the new American policy outlines. The committee completed its mission on August 20, 1945. Accordingly, the U.S. administration notified its diplomatic missions in the region about the policy in a detailed and extremely confidential memorandum. The memo identified American policy objectives in the region as follows:

1. To prop up the US independent interests to ensure peace and security in the region on the basis of good neighborhood.
2. To recognize the peoples' right to choose economic, social and political systems they desire to have.
3. To ensure equal opportunity among countries on the basis of equity, and to renounce seclusion policy or discrimination in trade or transport.
4. To insure protection of all American citizens in the region and to broaden current American economic rights and their potential prospective.[49]

It is important to point out that the U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt visited three major countries in the Red Sea towards the end of the WWII. The meetings came to symbolise America's growing interest in the Red Sea region. On the way home from the February 1945 conference in Yalta; president Franklin D. Roosevelt entertained King Farouk of Egypt, emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, and King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia. The meetings took place on board the heavy cruiser Quincy (CA 71), anchored in Egypt's Great Bitter Lake on the Suez Canal. The meeting with King Saud, as president Roosevelt later put it, "was perfectly amazing." The president arranged for the destroyer Murphy (DD 603) to carry the King and his retinue from Jeddah, the port of the holy city of Mecca on the Red Sea, to the Great Bitter Lake.[50]

Also, president Roosevelt entertained emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, It was also the strategic interest that provided the motivation for a change in the U.S. attitude toward the Red Sea, as well as Ethiopia, which later became the basis for the U.S. and British cooperation in the course of negotiations for the disposition of the former Italian colonies of Libya, Eritrea and Italian Somaliland in the Red Sea. No longer were the U.S. interests in Ethiopia defined primarity by economic or commercial considerations. U.S. interests now zeroed in on Eritrea's strategic importance vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia and the Middle East in general. In the same way, U.S. interests in Ethiopia after 1946 was centered on Eritrea and the communication facility there.[51]

Another U.S. interest in the Saudi was in Dhahran. The initial entry of the U.S. armed forces into the Saudi occurred almost incidentally at the end of WWII, when the United States requested permission to build a modern airbase at Dhahran, near the Hasa oilfields, to support the movement of men and material into the Burmese theater. Little progress was made by the end of the war, but the U.S. Army Air Corps saw the project through to completion in 1946. The Air Force leased Dhahran Airfield continuously for over a decade and a half, providing both reassurance and discomfort to their Saudi hosts.[52]

The U.S. State Department felt that a base in the Middle East would be essential to forging new alliances in that region. As the former ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Parker Hart noted in his book *Saudi Arabia and the United States*

> "Birth of a Security Partnership, the airbase came to represent more than a military installation the airfield, more than any other tangible achievement in the U.S.-Saudi relations was, and remained for fifteen years, a touchstone of the quality and durability of the U.S. connection a concrete symbol of official U.S. interest in Saudi security".[53]

The establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 represented a prime change in the Red Sea region adding a new dimension to the US interests. Protecting Israel has become a main priority of the U.S. policy in the Middle East. Consequently, providing security to Israel and freedom of navigation in the Red Sea have become the main objectives of U.S. policy in this region. What is of concern here is that Israel is located on the Red Sea and consequently the basis of the United States policy in the Red Sea is to secure the free maritime navigation for Israel and imposing its marine control on the Red Sea.

In March 1949, in a military operation, Israel occupied the Jordanian village of Um Rashrash on the coast of the Gulf of Aqaba, after the signing of an armistice agreement between Israel and the Arab states. The Israeli violation of the armistice was in order to secure a foothold on the Red Sea coast. Eilat harbor on the Gulf of Aqaba connects Israel with the Red Sea. Before 10 March 1949, Israel did not have any presence in the Red Sea.[54]

Even the name Eilat did not appear in the Arab region since the harbor had been known as Um Rashrash, the Arab harbor on Aqaba Gulf. Israel was fully aware of the importance to have an exit on the Red Sea. Therefore, in March 1949 Israeli troops violated the truce agreement imposed by the International Security Council on Israelis and Arabs. Israeli troops launched operations against Egyptian forces in al Negev and Siena; they crossed truce lines and occupied its current coastal site on the Aqaba Gulf. They occupied the Arab city of Um Rashrash and re-named it Eilat in June 1952.[55] When Israel occupied this harbor, it separated Egypt from Jordan and divided the Arab world into two parts for the first time throughout Arab and Muslim history. By doing so, it has made the old Zionist dream a reality in obtaining an outlet on the Red Sea and opened a bloody chapter of Arab-Israeli conflict on the Red Sea.[56]

In a memorandum addressed to Justice Brandeis of the U.S. Supreme Court in 1934, David Ben-Gurion explained the importance of Eilat "Through the Gulf of Eilat and the Red Sea we have an open-water route to the Indian Ocean, and to the largest continent in the world, which contains more than half the human race. It is important that we stake a claim on this place..."[57] In September 1955, Ben- Gurion (upon returning as prime minister after an extended stay at Side Boker in the Negev, by which he hoped to arouse greater public interests in settling the region) pledged that freedom of

navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba would be established. Following Egyptian threats to restore the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba, Ben-Gurion made it clear that Israel would resist any such move militarily. [58]

Since the creation of the State of Israel, free navigation through the Red Sea has always been prominent in Israel`s strategic thinking. In fact, Chaim Weizmann convinced president Truman of the necessity to include the southern Negev Desert and its outlet on the Gulf of Aqaba within the projected Jewish state. He pleaded: 'If the Egyptians choose to be hostile to the Jewish State., which I hope will not be the case; they can close navigation to us through the Suez Canal when this becomes their property.'[59] Since then, free access to the Red Sea has been so crucial in Israel policy that the two wars in 1956 and 1967 could be largely attributed to securing this accessibility.[60]

The main three wars of (1956, 1967, and 1973) between the Arabs and Israel were directly related to access to the Red Sea. The U.S. policy played an influential role in the three wars, as the U.S. viewed Israeli security in the Red Sea to be crucially important for the U.S. and its national security. Although it may not be easy for Israel to defend its shipping lanes at remote choke-points, it can use powerful countermeasures in other theatres where it may have an advantage.

Conclusions

Before WWI, the Red Sea remained outside of the U.S. strategic considerations, and precisely for this reason, the U.S. interests in the Red Sea was exclusively commercial. Since the end of WWI, the U.S. interests in the Red Sea began to evolve and it is no longer limited only to business concerns but entered other dimensions, the cultural and diplomatic dimensions. The economic dimension grew with the discovery of oil in the Gulf region. The Red Sea was linked to the Gulf region as a passage to transport oil to Europe and the U.S. The transformation of U.S. interest in the Red Sea from one that focused on commerce to one that came to zero in exclusively on geopolitical and strategic interest reflected the major change in the international system following the WWII, a change that catapulted the U.S. to be a dominant power in the world. One result of the new role that the U.S. had come to assume after the war was the unprecedented expansion of America's conception of the scope and limit of its national and security interests. The U.S. rise to "globalism" that came to usher in the period of Pax Americana was to bring the Red Sea into the U.S. geopolitical and strategic interest.

The U.S. interests in the Red Sea during post-World War II era can be said to span three dimensions which emerged during these years. The first dimension: the increasingly growing role oil resources began to play in the U.S. policy. The region weighed in the minds of the U.S. strategists because of its proximity to the Persian Gulf region which controls more than half of the world's proven oil reserves and supplies about 60 percent of Europe's oil and 90 percent of Japan's and a fast growing percentage of the U.S. oil consumption in the future.

The second dimension: the importance of the Red Sea's geographical strategic location for the U.S. military requirements, especially after World War II. This new dimension erupted in the need to supply the weakened Allied partners in conflict with the Axis powers. The U.S. then abandoned its conventional policy that was based on competition in economic fields only. The U.S. military presence Red Sea began with acquiring the Ethiopian base at Kegnew station.

The third dimension: the beginning of confrontation with Pan-Arab movements after American support had increased for Zionist claims to establish a homeland for Jews in the Palestine territories. After 1949 the Red Sea would become a part of the geographic and strategic Arab-Israeli conflict. The Red Sea was not a marginal waterway for the Arab-Israeli conflict. Rather, it is a frontline of this conflict and so will continue to have further impact on the U.S. policy in the region.

Notes

[1] Salwa Ahmed Qasem Dammag is a Ph.D candidate in the Department of History, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Malaya and an assistant teacher in the Department of Political Science, University of Sana'a, Yemen. Shakila Yacob is an associate professor at the Department of History, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Malaya.

[2] W. R. Polk, 1965. *The United States and the Arab World.* London: Harvard University Press, p. 261.

[3] G. Lenezowski, 1956. *The Middle East In World Affairs*. New York: Cornell University Press, p. 88; Z. Brezezinski, 1988. America's New Strategy. *Foreign Affairs* (66) 4, p. 22.

[4] B. Perkins, 1993. *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations: Volume 1, The Creation of a Republican Empire, 1776-1865.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 201-203; see M.T. Klare, 1975. Super Power Rivalry at Sea. *Foreign Policy* 21, pp. 86-167.

[5] For more details about the history of the Red Sea, see Steven Smith, 2008. *The Red Sea Region 6 Volume Set: Sovereignty, Boundaries and Conflict, 1839-1967*. Slough: Archive Editions.

[6] Mocha is famous for being the major marketplace for coffee from the 15th century until the 17th century. Even after other sources of coffee were found, Mocha beans continued to be prized for their distinctive flavor and remain so even today. Encyclopedia Britannica. [online] Available at: http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/386883/Mocha (Accessed 12 July 2011).

[7] A. N. Almadhagi, 1996. *Yemen and the United States: A Study of Small Power and Super-State Relationship 1962-1994.* London, New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, p. 11.

[8] E. Macro, 1960. *Yemen and the Western World*. London: IB Turst, p. 25.

[9] Madeehah Darweesh, 2002. *U.S. Activity in Yemen Between the Two World Wars (1918-1939), Study Documents From U.S. Consular Archive in Aden.* Cairo: Egyptian General Book, p. 66.

[10] Madeehah Darweesh, p. 68.

[11] Ibid., p. 38.

[12] D. Shinn, 1971. A survey of American-Ethiopian relations prior to the Italian occupation of Ethiopia. *Ethiopia observer* (14), p. 297-311; see H. Marcus, 1963. A note on the first United States diplomatic mission to Ethiopia in 1903. *Ethiopia Observer* (7) 2.

[13] T. Alemu, 1983. The Unmaking of Ethio- American Military Relations: US foreign Policy Toward the Ethiopian Revolution. Ph.D. Thesis, Claremont Graduate University, 1983, p. 28.

[14] Ibid., p. 29.

[15] *Foreign Relations of the United States,* 1927, Vol. II, p. 595.

[16] R. L. Playfair, 1859. *A History of Arabia Felix Or Yemen: From the Commencement of the Christian Era to the Present Time; Including an Account of the British Settlement of Aden* (No. 49). Government at the Education Society's Press, Byculla, p. 19.

[17] For more details see C. Legum, 1979. The International Dimensions of the Power Struggle in The Horn of Africa. *The Atlantic Community Quarterly* 17 (3), pp. 257-264.

[18] J.S. Corbett. 1920. *History of the Great War Based on Official Documents: Naval Operations. To the Battle of the Falklands, December 1914*. Longmans, Green & Company., p. 386.

[19] Atef Sayed, 1985. *Red Sea and the Contemporary World: Strategic, political and Historical Study*. Cairo: Dar Atwa Printing, p. 188.

[20] Ibid., p. 200.

[21] Sayed Mustafa Salem, 2006. Red Sea and Yemeni Islands, Cause and History. *al-Mathak* 22 (2), p. 114.

[22] R. W. Stooky, 1975. *America and the Arab States: An Uneasy Encounter*. New York: Wiley, 1975, p. 53.

[23] Ibid., p. 66.

[24] U.S. Department of State, 1998. *Background Notes, State of Eritrea* [online] Available at http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/eritrea_0398_bgn.html (Accessed 4 March 2012).

[25] R.W. Stooky, *America and the Arab States: An Uneasy Encounter,* p. 66.

[26] R. A. Hare, 1972. The Great Divide: World War II. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, *401*(1), p. 25.

[27] Lend-Lease was a program of the United States Federal government during World War II which enabled the United States to provide the Allied nations with war materials while the U.S. was still officially a neutral country. The Lend-Lease program began in March 1941, nine months before the US entered the war in December of 1941. Lend-Lease came on the heels of Cash and Carry, following correspondence between Churchill and FDR on the economic status of England and their inability to pay for and transport materials as they once did. It ended soon after V-J Day, on September 2, 1945. This program was the first large step away from American isolationism and towards international involvement since the end of WWI. It allowed America to "lend" supplies to England, and to any country vital to U.S. security, US Department of State, Official History, 1937. *Lend-Lease and Military Aid to the Allies in the Early Years of World War II.* [online] Available at http://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/LendLease (Accessed 2 April 2012).

[28] Sayed Mustafa Salem, 2006. Red Sea and Yemeni Islands, Cause and History. *al-Mathak* 22 (2), p. 84.

[29] Asmara was the capital of Eritrea, then the northernmost province of Ethiopia. Eritrea had been a sovereign nation until colonised by Italy in 1890, but in the sorting out that followed World War II, the United Nations handed it over to Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie. As Yohannes points out "The Ethiopian-Eritrean federation was installed by the Western powers under the leadership of the United States purely for geopolitical considerations. This UN-sanctioned federation in essence became a denial of Eritrea's right to national self-determination. When Ethiopia annexed Eritrea by force in 1962, the United States remained silent because this action served its interests. The annexation increased Addis Ababa's control over Eritrea's political life facilitating U.S. operation in the province. John R Rasmuson, 2007. *Remembering the Kegnew Station.* [online] Available at http://www.ausa.org/publications/armymagazine/archive/2007/6/Documents/Rasmuson_0607.pdf (Accessed 4 July 2012).

[30] See J. F. Campbell, 1970. Rumblings Along the Red Sea: The Eritrean Question. *Foreign Affairs* 48(3), pp. 537-548.

[31] P. J. Schraeder, 1994. *United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 115.

[32] Ibid., p. 120.

[33] S. Shelley, 1981. The Image of the Arab in America: Analysis of a Poll on American Attitudes. *Middle East Journal* 35 (2), pp. 140-144; see U.S. Congress. 1976. U.S. Arms Policies in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea Areas: Past, Present and Future, Washington, p. 172- 175.

[34] T. Alemu, p. 38.

[35] R.A. Diamond & D. Fouquet, 1972. American Military Aid to Ethiopia and Insurgency. *African Today* 19 (1), p. 40; J. H. Spencer, 1977. *Ethiopia, The Horn of Africa, and U.S. Policy*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, p. 24; C. A. Crocker, 1968. External Military Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa. *Africa Today* 15 (2), pp. 265-280.

[36] PA/HO, 1 2958, *The response to National Security Studies Memorandum 115: Horn of Africa, 15 March 1971.* State of Department, 21 April 2005.

[37] *African Research Bulletin,* July 1964, p. 108.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Alexander AttilioVadala, 2003. Major geopolitical explanations of conflict in the Horn of Africa. *Quarta,* [e-journal], Available at:. http://www.gigahamburg.de/sites/default/files/openaccess/nordsuedaktuell/2003_4/giga_nsa_2003_4_vadala.pdf (Accessed 23 July 2012).

[40] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Vol. V, p. 244- 245.

[41] Ibid., p. 934

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid.

[44] S. Klebanoff, 1974. *Middle East Oil and the U.S. Foreign Policy, with Special Reference to the U.S. Energy Crisis*. New York: Praeger, p. 3.

[45] A. Rosselli, 1960. *Italian Raid on Manama*. [online] Available at http//www,comandosupero.com/ Manam. Htm [Accessed 12 March 2012).

[46] FO 731/24588, in the GCC States National Development Records19 October 1940: Defense 1920-1960, Vol. 6, p. 649.

[47] Secretary of State Vance, 1979. Face the Nation interview, *CBC News*.

[48] U.S. Senate, 1948.Congressional Record, 80th Congress, 2nd Session , No. 1.94, 4:4998.

[49] See F O 371/45267, Great Britain Foreign Office, Squire to Baxter, 1 July 1945.

[50] J. Schneller, 2007. *Anchor of Resolve: A History of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command/Fifth Fleet*, p. 25; A. D. Miller, 1980. *Search for Security,* Chapel Hill: University of North Caroline Press, pp. 54-57; David E. Lon, 1985. *The United States and Saudi Arabia.* Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, p. 117.

[51] R. J. Schneller, *p*. 25.

[52] J. Pollack, 2002. Saudi Arabia and the United 1931-2002. *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 6 (3), p. 79.

[53] P.T. Hart, 1998. *Saudi Arabia and the United States: Birth of a Security Partnership. Indianapolis*. Indiana: University Press, p. Xviii.

[54] See Shalom Zaki, 2002. *David Ben-Gurion, the State of Israel and the Arab World, 1949-1956*. Sussex Academic Press.

[55] Israelis concentrated on the Negev area given that is the only part of the region that can connect them with the Red Sea. They exerted tireless efforts to make it part of their State's borders. When the UN general assembly convened in Autumn, 1947 to discuss the Palestinian case, it was clear that mainstream attitudes tended towards dividing the territory into two states: one for Palestinians and the other for Israelis. Israelis did their utmost efforts to persuade the great powers, particularly the U.S. to make the Negev part of Israel. That is what happened, thanks to American president Harry Truman's support. Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann met with Truman and persuaded him that it was important to make the Negev part of the Jewish state. To annex the Negev, Zionists did not hesitate to murder the UN mediator Volk Bernadotte just because he suggested that Negev shall be separated from Jewish state and annexed to Arab part. (The Negev was only one of several areas where Count Bernadotte had angered the Lehi and other Israeli elements). Walid Jaradat, *The strategic importance of the Red Sea: between past and present,* p. 315. Following the declaration of the Zionist State, they devoted great deal of funds to reform the Negev and establish settlements there so as to carry out their expansion schemes on the Red Sea. Through Negev, Israelis could infiltrate into Red Sea coasts, then to Asia and Africa. Ibid., p. 326.

[56] Abdel Azim Ramadan, 1982. *Egyptian-Israeli Conflict in Red Sea, 1949-1979,* Cairo: Matabi Muassasat Ruz al Yusuf, p. 44.

[57] David Ben-Gurion, 1963. *Israel: years of challenge*, Tel-Aviv: Massadah - P.E.C. Press, p. 54.

[58] Ali El-Hakim, 1979. *The Middle Eastern States and the Law of the Sea*, Syracuse, N.Y: Syracuse University Press, pp. 132.

[59] Nadia Saad al-Dean, 2003. Israeli penetration in Africa. *Al Mustaqbal Al Arabi Journal* 292, p. 165.

[60] Ibid.

References

African Research Bulletin, July 1964.

Alemu, T., 1983. The Unmaking of Ethio- American Military Relations: US foreign Policy Toward the Ethiopian Revolution. Ph.D. Thesis, Claremont Graduate University, 1983.

Alexander, A. V., 2003. Major geopolitical explanations of conflict in the Horn of Africa. *Quarta,* [e-journal], Available at:. http://www.gigahamburg.de/sites/default/files/openaccess/nordsuedaktuell/2003_4/giga_nsa_2003_4_vadala.pdf (Accessed 23July 2012).

Almadhagi, A. N., 1996. *Yemen and the United States: A Study of Small Power and Super-State Relationship 1962-1994.* London, New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers.

PA/HO, 12958, *The response to National Security Studies Memorandum 115: Horn of Africa, 15 March 1971.* State of Department, 21 April 2005.

Ben-Gurion, David, 1963. *Israel: years of challenge*. Tel-Aviv: Massadah - P.E.C. Press.

Brezezinski, Z., 1988. America's New Strategy. *Foreign Affairs* (66) 4.

Campbell, J. F., 1970. Rumblings Along the Red Sea: The Eritrean Question. *Foreign Affairs* 48(3).

Corbett, J.S., 1920. *History of the Great War Based on Official Documents: Naval Operations. To the Battle of the Falklands, December 1914*. Longmans, Green & Company.

Crocker, C. A., 1968. External Military Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa. *Africa Today* 15(2).

Darweesh, Madeehah, 2002. *U.S. Activity in Yemen Between the Two World Wars (1918-1939), Study Documents From U.S. Consular Archive in Aden.* Cairo: Egyptian General Book.

Diamond, R.A. & Fouquet, D., 1972. American Military Aid to Ethiopia and Insurgency. *African Today* 19 (1).

El-Hakim, Ali, 1979. *The Middle Eastern States and the Law of the Sea*. Syracuse, N.Y: Syracuse University Press.

FO 731/24588, in the GCC States National Development Records 19 October 1940: Defense 1920-1960, Vol. 6.

FO 371/45267, Great Britain Foreign Office, Squire to Baxter, 1 July 1945.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1927, Vol. II.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Vol. III and Vol. V.

Hart, P.T., 1998. *Saudi Arabia and the United States: Birth of a Security Partnership. Indianapolis*. Indiana: University Press.

Hare, R. A., 1972. The Great Divide: World War II. *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, *401* (1).

Klare, M. T., 1975. Super Power Rivalry at Sea. *Foreign Policy* 21.

Klebanoff, S., 1974. *Middle East Oil and the U.S. Foreign Policy, with Special Reference to the U.S. Energy Crisis*. New York: Praeger.

Legum, C., 1979. The International Dimensions of the Power Struggle in The Horn of Africa. *The Atlantic Community Quarterly* 17(3).

Lenezowski, G., 1956. *The Middle East In World Affairs*. New York: Cornell University.

Lon, D. E., 1985. *The United States and Saudi Arabia.* Boulder, Colo: Westview Press.

Macro, E., 1960. *Yemen and the Western World*. London: IB Turst.

Marcus, H., 1963. A note on the first United States diplomatic mission to Ethiopia in 1903. *Ethiopia observer* (7)2.

Miller, A. D., 1980. *Search for Security*. Chapel Hill: University of North Caroline Press.

Perkins, B., 1993. *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations: Volume 1, The Creation of a Republican Empire, 1776-1865*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Playfair, R. L., 1859. *A History of Arabia Felix Or Yemen: From the Commencement of the Christian Era to the Present Time; Including an Account of the British Settlement of Aden* (No. 49). Government at the Education Society's Press, Byculla.

Polk, W. R., 1965. *The United States and the Arab World*. London: Harvard University Press.

Pollack, J., 2002. Saudi Arabia and the United 1931-2002. *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 6 (3).

Ramadan, Abdel Azim, 1982. *Egyptian-Israeli Conflict in Red Sea, 1949-1979*. Cairo: Matabi Muassasat Ruz al Yusuf.

Rasmuson, J. R., 2007. *Remembering the Kegnew Station.* [online] Available at http://www.ausa.org/publications/armymagazine/archive/2007/6/Documents/Rasmuson_0607.pdf (Accessed 4 July 2012).

Rosselli, A., 1960. *Italian Raid on Manama*. [online] Available at http//www,comandosupero.com/ Manam. Htm (Accessed 12 March 2012).

Salem, Sayed Mustafa, 2006. Red Sea and Yemeni Islands, Cause and History. *al-Mathak* 22 (2).

Sayed, Atef, 1985. *Red Sea and the Contemporary World: Strategic, political and Historical Study*. Cairo: Dar Atwa Printing.

Secretary of State Vance, 1979. Face the Nation interview, *CBC News.*

Schraeder, P. J., 1994. *United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Shelley, S., 1981. The Image of the Arab in America: Analysis of a Poll on American Attitudes. *Middle East Journal* 35(2).

Schneller, R. J., 2007. *Anchor of Resolve: A History of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command/ Fifth Fleet*. Dept. of the Navy.

Shinn, D., 1971. A survey of American-Ethiopian relations prior to the Italian occupation of Ethiopia. *Ethiopia observer* (14).

Smith Steven, 2008. *The Red Sea Region 6 Volume Set: Sovereignty, Boundaries and Conflict, 1839-1967*. Slough: Archive Editions.

Spencer, J. H., 1977. *Ethiopia, The Horn of Africa, and U.S. Policy*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis.

Stooky, R. W., 1975. *America and the Arab States: An Uneasy Encounter*. New York: Wiley, 1975.

U.S. Congress, 1976. U.S. Arms Policies in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea Areas: Past, Present and Future, Washington.

U.S. Department of State, 1998. *Background Notes, State of Eritrea* [online] Available at http://www.state.gov/www/background_notes/eritrea_0398_bgn.html [Accessed 4 March 2012).

U.S. Department of State, Official History, 1937. *Lend-Lease and Military Aid to the Allies in the Early Years of World War II.* [online] Available at http://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/LendLease (Accessed 2 April 2012).

U.S. Senate, 1948.Congressional Record, 80th Congress, 2nd Session, 1.94(4).